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THE POSSIBILITY OF INEFFICIENT CORPORATE
CONTRACTS
Ian Ayres·
As in other areas of law, the application of game theory to corpo-
rations began with the use of the prisoners dilemma. Several schol-
ars noted that the use of two-tier tender offers might place target
shareholders with the dilemma of either tendering their shares at a
price below their evaluation or facing a the back end freeze out
purchase at an even lower amount. I The inroads of the "new learn-
ing" in game theory have, until very recently, been rarely applied to
corporate law issues.2 This "new learning" developed by econo-
• Visiting Professor of Law, Yale University; Professor, Stanford Law School.
B.A., Yale University; Ph.D. (Economics), M.I.T.;J.D., Yale Law School. I would like to
thank Rob Gertner, Jeff Gordon, and Peter Huang for helpful comments. This piece is
based on remarks presented at the University of Cincinnati Symposium on Corporations
and Game Theory.
I. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate
Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1696 (1985);Jonathan R. Macey & Fred S. McChesney,
A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail, 95 YALE LJ. 13,22 (1985); Ian Ayres, Playing
Games with the Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1291, 1315 (1990).
2. For three excellent examples of recent applications of the new game theoretic
techniques to corporate laws, see John C. Coffee, Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance
as a Multi-Player Game, 78 GEO. LJ. 1495 (1990); David Leebron, Games Corporations Play:
A Theory of Tender Offers, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 153 (1986); and Jason S.Johnston, Opting In
and Opting Out: Bargaining for Fiduciary Duties in Cooperative Ventures (Sept., 1990)
(unpublished manuscript).
More generally, this new learning is being applied by law professors and being
published in traditional law reviews at a surprisingly rapid rate. While I recently wrote
that several substantive, technical and political factors might inhibit the spread of game-
theoretic techniques into the legal academy, see Ayres, supra note I, at 1315, the number
of published articles and works-in-progress produced in the last six months makes me
think that the academy's resistance to this new methodologic virus may be weaker than I
expected. Very soon it will be impossible to provide a comprehensive bibliographic
footnote in their introduction. Nonetheless, recent works incorporating the new
methods of modeling incomplete information include: Douglas Baird & Randy Picker, A
Simple Noncooperative Bargaining Model of Corporate Reorganizations, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 311
(1991); Lucian Bebchuk & Chaim Fershtman, The Effect of Insider Trading on Insider Trading
on Insider's Reaction to Opportunities to "Waste" Corporate Value, HARV. PROGRAM IN L. &
ECON., No. 76 (Sept. 1990); Samuel Issacaroff & George Lowenstein, Second Thought
About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE LJ. 73 (1990); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic
Bargaining and the Economic Theory ofContract Default Rules, 100 YALE LJ. 615 (1990); Avery
Katz, Your Terms or Mine: The Duty to Read the Fine Print in Contracts, 24 RAND J. ECON. 518
(1990); Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law of
Contract Formation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 215 (1990); Alan Schwartz, The Myth that Promisees
Prefer Supracompensatory Remedies: An Analysis of Contracting for Damages Measures, 100 YALE
LJ. 369 (1990); Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 209 (1989);
Lucian Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of
Contract (April, 1989) (unpublished manuscript on file at Harvard Law School). My
apologies in advance to the works that I have undoubtedly overlooked. These include a
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mists in the 1970's and 1980's consists largely of theoretical break-
throughs in how to model dynamic games in which "players" have
private information.3
For those uninitiated in this new learning, let me suggest three
ways to tell when you are reading a game-theory piece that is by-
product of this new learning.4 First, games will often be depicted
with game trees instead of pay-off matrices. Second, the game will
specify that there are two (or multiple) types of a particular class of
player. And third, there will' often be asymmetric information. If
you see an article with anyone of these attributes, odds are that the
author is toiling in this new vineyard.5
Not surprisingly, these three shibboleths are related. The use of
game trees (what game theorists call extensive form representa-
tions) much more adeptly captures informational assumptions and
their impact on how the game is played.6 And the assumption that
there are two types of a particular class of player is often used to
generate asymmetric information when other players in the game
cannot tell initially what type they are playing with.7
The explicit introduction of multiple types of players also repre-
sents an important advance in the economic analysis of contractual
bodies oflaw, such as corporations, because if there are heterogene-
ous types on one side of the contract, then efficient contracting will
vast list of works by economists analyzing legal issues. See, e.g., Philippe Aghion &
Benjamin Hermalin, Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency, 6 J.L.
ECON. & ORGANIZATION 381 (1990); Samuel J. Rea, Arm-Breaking, Consumer Credit and
Personal Bankruptcy, 22 ECON. INQ.U1RY 188 (1984).
3. See Ayres, supra note I, at 1317.
4. Professor Shubik divided the game-theoretic literature along another dimension
regarding the mathematical sophistication of the modeling. See Martin Shubik, Game
Theory, Law, and the Concept of Competition, 60 U. GIN. L. REV. 285, 298 (1991) (discussing
high church, low church, and conversational approaches). All three levels of
sophistication have been used by contributors to this new learning literature.
5. The new learning has been almost exclusively concerned with non-cooperative
games. For a more detailed discussion of the appropriate use of cooperative and non-
cooperative games, see Ian Ayres, Three Approaches to Modeling Corporate Games: Some
Observations, 60 U. GIN. L. REV. 419 (1991); David Leebron, A Game Theoretic Approach to
the Regulation ofForeign Direct Investment and the Multinational Corporation, 60 U. GIN. L. REV.
305, 308 (1991); Shubik, supra note 4.
6. In contrast, the use of pay-off matrices for the prisoner's dilemma and "battle of
the sexes" games is better suited to games of complete information. See ERIC RASMUSEN,
GAMES AND INFORMATION 27-30, 55 (1989).
7. For example, in contract law, several scholars have modeled the issue of
consequential damages in Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854), by
positing two types of shippers - one with high consequential damages and another with
low consequential damages - and assuming that the carriers initially cannot distinguish
between the two. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts, An
Economics Theory ofDefault Rules, 99 YALE LJ. 87, 101-04 (1989);Johnston, supra note 2, at
621-22; Bebchuk & Shavell, supra note 2.
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often necessitate heterogeneity in the contractual equilibrium. This
is a significant departure from what I would call "first generation"
law and economic analysis of contracts, which often sought to dis-
cover the single legal rule that would maximize the gains from trade
for the contracting parties. This is also often the mode of corporate
and economic analysis: many articles propose a single legal rule
that promotes the efficiency or gains of trade for all corporate con-
tracts. But this "first generation" mode of analysis, in an important
sense, proves too much: if the authors have really discovered a rule
that enhances efficiency for all contracting types, then one should be
agnostic about whether to make the rule mandatory or merely a de-
fault that parties can contract around.8 Since there is a strong con-
sensus that many corporate and contractual rules should be defaults
that parties may contract around,9 the new game theory models
which generate contractual heterogeneity are much better suited to
analyze the three primordial questions of contractual freedom:
(1) should a particular rule be immutable?
(2) if not immutable, what is the most appropriate default?, and
(3) if a default, what are the necessary and sufficient conditions
for contracting around the rule?lO
In this piece, I would like to continue a discussion, or more pre-
cisely revise an answer that I gave to Dan Fischel a couple of years
ago at Chicago's Law and Economics Workshop. Rob Gertner and I
were presenting an article about how to choose efficient contractual
defaults. I I Among other things, Rob and I argued that contractual
parties with private information might strategically refuse to bargain
for socially efficient rules in order to protect the returns to their
private information. 12 A part of our article suggested that effi-
ciency-minded lawmakers might at times want to promulgate "pen-
alty" defaults that induce the private contracting parties to contract
around the undesirable defaults and thereby reveal their private in-
formation. 13 Although this contract article proposed a few applica-
8. This analysis is related to Bernie Black's recent insights, that many mandatory
corporate rules are precisely the ones that parties would not want to contract around.
See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U.
L. REV. 542, 543-44 (1990).
9. The issue of whether corporate laws should be immutable received extensive and
insightful treatment in a recent symposium. Lucian Bebchuk, Foreward; The Debate on
Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, in Contractual Freedom, in Corporate Law: Articles &
Comments, 89COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989).
10. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 7, at 119 n.133 (1989).
II. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 7.
12. See Johnston, supra note 2, at 621-22.
13. John Colfee has explicitly applied the use of penalty or "information forcing"
defaults to corporate issues of managers' fiduciary duties. John Colfee, The
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tions in the corporate context,14 Fischel asked at the seminar
whether our model had any implications in the corporate context.
His interest in the issue is not surprising. Easterbrook and Fischel
have forcefully argued that corporate default rules should "dupli-
cate the terms the parties would have selected ... if they had con-
tracted explicitly." 15 If the possibility of inefficient strategic
bargaining in private contracts could be generalized to the corpo-
rate context, these new game-theoretic models might limit or qualify
this hypothetical contracting norm. Although at the time of that
seminar, I told Dan that I thought there were few possibilities for
the inefficiencies of strategic bargaining in the corporate context, I
am here today to recant in a small way and give a slightly different
answer. 16 In particular, my thesis is that strategic interactions may
lead to inefficient corporate contracting (a) even in a world where
there are numerous shareholder/investors competing to make in-
vestments and (b) even when it is costless to contract around a given
default.
At first blush, one might argue that game theoretic approaches to
modeling the corporate governance contracts of large publicly
traded businesses are inappropriate because the cost of contracting
around any default rule will be negligible in proportion to the po-
tential effect on corporate value.J7 If either side can costlessly con-
tract around a given default rule, traditional law and economics
scholarship would posit that parties would be able to find and in-
clude the contractual provisions that maximize the gains from
trade. IS
Secondly, the potential for strategic inefficiency might be limited
by the sheer number of players that ex ante are potentially on the
Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, in Contractural
Freedom in Corporate Law: Articles & Comments, supra note 9, at 1618, 1680; see generally
Robert Scott, A Relational Theory ofDefault Rulesfor Commercial Contracts, 19J. LEGAL. STUD.
597 (1990) (discussing use of information forcing rules in contract law).
14. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 7 at Ill, 121 n.148 (discussing promoter liability
and restrictions on how to contract around).
15. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1416, 1433 (1989). A version of this article also appears in CORPORATE LAw AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 182 (Lucian Bebchuk ed., 1990) and FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & .
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAw (forthcoming 1991).
16. John Coffee's work in this area already provides a very important rejection ofthis
hypothetical contract standard. See Coffee, supra note 13 at 1634.
17. After all, corporate lawyers can often extract significant rents from transactions
without inhibiting corporate participation.
18. In the model of Ayres & Gertner, supra note 7, at 109-111, there are positive
costs of contracting that playa role in keeping certain parties from contracting around
inefficient rules. As shown below, however, general models exist in which inefficient
contracting can be generated, even in frictionless contracting settings.
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various sides of the corporate contract. Numerosity, after all, un-
dermines strategic interactions in the standard price theory
models. 19 This piece argues that neither costless contracting nor
the ex ante numerosity of potential contracting parties sufficiently en-
sures efficient contracting. To support this thesis, the article will
analyze a model based on a seminal article by Rothschild and Stig-
litz20 (and recently updated by Aghion and Hermalin21 ) which dem-
onstrates how asymmetric information and adverse selection can
generate inefficient corporate debt contracts even though con-
tracting is costless and there is vigorous competition among numer-
ous lenders. I will then suggest how the results of this corporate
debt model could be applied to the inefficient selection of more
traditional legal rules. In particular, I'll discuss how attempts at
"signaling" can lead to inefficient separation in the equilibrium con-
tractual terms regardless of the initial default choice. Fischel and Easter-
brook are vindicated in so far as they argue that default choice does
not change the equilibrium - but they are wrong in arguing that
the equilibrium will necessarily be efficient.
I also briefly discuss types of government intervention that may
be successful in improving a strategic problem. Having done all of
this, in the final portion I will try to undercut this simple signaling
model by discussing how signaling theory does not explain major
aspects of current corporate contracting in this age of enabling stat-
utes. In the end, Easterbrook and Fischel's hypothetical contracting
norm remains a powerful tool for analyzing default choice. My the-
sis is not that corporate contracts are inefficient, but that we can't
rely on small transaction costs or numerosity to ensure efficiency.
To the extent that we retain a belief in the efficiency of the corpo-
rate nexus of contracts, this article stimulates us to look further for
the structural forces that foster efficiency. In a world in which major
financial decisions are best analyzed as signals in models of asym-
metric information,22 the possibility for inefficient "excessive" sig-
naling through contractual provisions should remain an important
area for further research. Because signaling theories so dominate
the portion of the corporate contract relating to financial structure,
19. Wheat farmers, for example, are so numerous, that a single farmer has no
incentive to strategically withhold her production because of the de minimus impact in
price. Hence, the standard competitive assumption of price taking suppliers eliminates
game theoretic considerations from price theory.
20. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets:
An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 QJ. ECON. 629 (1976).
21. Aghion & Hermalin, supra note 2, at 398-401.
22. See, e.g., R. HUBBARD, ASYMMETRtC INFORMATION, CORPORATE FINANCE AND
INVESTMENT (R. Glenn ed., 1990).
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it would be premature to wholly discount the possibility that ineffi-
cient signaling has infected the portion of the corporate contract
relating to governance structure.
I. ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION MODELS OF INEFFICIENT SIGNALING
The following model of corporate debt financing is derived from
the excellent article of Aghion and Hermalin that appeared recently
in Yale'sJournal ofLaw, Economics and Organization.23 Consider a class
of closed corporations that wants to issue bonds to finance a project.
The lenders (and courts) will be able to tell ex post whether the pro-
ject succeeds or fails. Assume that there are both "good" and
"bad" projects in the world. Good projects have a higher
probability of success (i.e., lower probability of default) than bad
projects. Only corporations (its managers, if it is publicly held)
know whether their projects are good or bad. These assumptions
create a game with asymmetric information - because the corpo-
rate borrowers know something that the lenders do not. The as-
sumptions also imply that the success of the project is' contractible,
but the quality of the project is not. This implication appears be-
cause the lenders and courts can learn after the fact whether the
project succeeded but not whether it had a high probability of suc-
cess. Because success is contractible, the debt contract can be made
contingent on whether the contract succeeds but not on whether the
project was good or bad.
Under these assumptions, a debt contract to borrow D dollars can
be summarized by the amount that will need be repaid if the project·
fails or if it succeeds, (Pr and Ps respectively).24 The model assumes
that numerous investors will compete to finance the projects of the
closed corporations. Game theory can capture this competition by
allowing the corporations to propose take-it-or-leave-it contracts.
The power to make the take-it-or-leave-it offer gives the corpora-
tions all the gains from trade,25 because they can offer contracts that
leave the investor only imperceptibly better off than not investing -
this 'is, of course, the same result as competition.
23. Agion & Hermalin, supra note 2, at 383-87.
24. If corporate shareholders have limited wealth, there will be situations in which
"the promised repayment in the case of success must exceed the amount invested, which
in turn must exceed the promised repayment in the case of failure (i.e., P, > D > Pr)".
Aghion & Hermalin, supra note 2, at 384.
25. The assumption of a take-it-or-Ieave-it offer is related to Jeff Gordon's
discussion, of how the relative "impatience" of the bargainers will determine how the
gains from trade are distributed. See Jeffrey Gordon, Shareholder Initiative and Delegation: A
Social Choice and Game Theoretic Approach to Corporate Law, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 347, 379-80
(1991).
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To digress briefly, it is extremely important in analyzing contracts
with asymmetric information to identify the party that has superior
bargaining power. When the uninformed party has bargaining
power, it will have much greater ability to separate the good from
the bad on the other side of the transaction. In other words, the
bargaining power of the uninformed can counteract the power con-
ferred by the private information. In the model sketched above, the
informed party (the corporation) also has the bargaining power and
consequently the uninformed lenders may have more difficulty in-
d~cing separation in equilibrium.26
Finally, a'ssume that the shareholders of the corporation are risk-
averse (because of undiversifiable human capital) and the lenders
are risk-neutral. Under these assumptions, one can graph the set of
contracts that the lenders would be willing to accept under condi-
tions of symmetric and asymmetric information. If there is symmet-
ric information, so that in equilibrium the lenders know whether
they are funding good or bad projects, they will be willing to lend to
bad projects but at higher promises of repayment than for good
projects. In Graph A, the set of contracts that lenders would be will-
ing to make with known bad and good corporations are depicted by
the straight lines Lb and Lg respectively. Every point on these lines
represents a contract (with contingent repayment terms Pr and Ps)
that informed lenders would be willing to enter. If, however, the
lenders cannot distinguish between the good and the bad
projects/corporations and believe that in equilibrium that they are
lending to both types, they will be willing to offer lending contracts
along the pooled lending line, Lp, that represents a weighted aver-
age of the competitive contracts in the symmetric equilibrium. The
relative position of this pooled lending line will depend on the lend-
ers' knowledge of the proportion of good and bad projects to be
financed.
26. By changing the incidence of bargaining power - who gets to make the take-it-
or-leave-it offer - modelers can come to dramatically different results. In the analysis
of consequential damages in Hadley v Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 147 (Ex. 1854),
compare Ayres & Gertner, supra note 7, at 102 (assuming shipper market power) with
Johnston, supra note 2, at 621-22 (assuming carrier market.power). See also Ian Ayres &
Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency, 104 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 1992). In the
original insurance context, compare Rothchild & Stiglitz, supra note 20 (assuming
insured market power) with Joseph Stiglitz, Monopoly, Nonlinear Pricing and Imperfect
Information: The Insurance Market. 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 407 (1977) (assuming insurer
market power).
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As with most asymmetric information models, it is assumed that
even when sellers don't know whether specific projects are good,
they do know the proportion of good projects in the economy.
In Graph B, the indifference curves of the corporations have a
convex curve (because the corporate shareholders are risk-averse)
and increasing toward the southwest (because corporations prefer
to repay less). A fundamental implication of the corporations' pri-
vate information about the likelihood of project success is that the
indifference curves for the bad project type corporations is more
steeply sloped than the indifference curve for the good project
corporations.
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This is because the bad corporation is more concerned about the
size of their repayments when the project fails than is the good cor-
poration and consequently is willing to trade off larger p. for a given
reduction in Pr. This difference in indifference curves is illustrated
in Graph C. In this graph, the indifference curves for both good and
bad corporations that pass through contract point A are graphed as
IB and IG•
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Point A represents the contract point along the pooled lending
line that seems to maximize the welfare of the good corporation.
This is because a good corporation's indifference curve is tangent to
the pooled lending line.27 But point A is not an equilibrium because
good corporations will have an incentive to try to signal that they
have good projects and hence garner lower repayment terms. In
Graph C, for example, good corporations would deviate from a
pooled equilibrium at the contract point A by offering, for example,
contract point C. Because good corporations have flatter indiffer-
ence curve, moving from contract A to contract C increases the util-
ity of the good corporations but decreases the utility of the bad
27. Lenders will not accept debt contracts to the southwest of the lending line, and
any points on the lending line other than A, and any points above the lending line, put
good corporations on lower utility indifference curves.
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corporations.28 Thus, only good corporations would offer contract
C relative to contract A - and if the bad corporations continued to
offer A contracts, lenders would be willing to accept C contracts,
knowing that only good corporations would make this offer (and be-
cause C contracts lie upon the good corporation lending line).
However, the bad corporations will not be allowed to passively sit
by and let the good corporations signal. Once the good corpora-
tions offer contract C, no lender will be willing to accept contract A
that the bad corporation offers. Because the good corporations
have separated themselves (by signaling their identity with contract
C offers), lenders will know that only bad corporations will offer A
contracts. Consequently the lenders would only lend to the passive
bad corporations along the bad corporation lending line, Lb. In
Graph C, if the bad corporations were forced to borrow along this
line they would chose the contract at point B which maximizes their
utility conditional on the lenders knowing their true identity.29
The bad corporations, however, are likely not to sit by passively
and allow the good corporations' signaling to reduce their utility
(from point A to point B). They have a counter strategy of sending
a false signal and matching the good corporations' contract Coffers.
For although contract C represents a fall in utility for bad corpora-
tions relative to the pooled lending at point A, it represents an in-
crease in utility for bad corporations relative to the separating
contractual equilibrium for bad corporations at point B. Rather
than be found out, the bad corporations will try to send inefficient
signals. The process of signaling then is the struggle of good types
trying to run away from the bad types, and the struggle of the bad
types to run after and falsely match the good type's signals. Ifit is in
the bad corporation's interest to falsely match, (i.e. they prefer point
C to point A), then lenders will stop lending to even good corpora-
tions at point C. Lenders would no longer know whether the a spe-
cific corporation making a point C contract offer was good or bad
and consequently would reject the offer because it lays below the
pooled lending line, Lp•
Graph D shows the possibility for an equilibrium when signaling
does effectively separate the good corporations from the bad corpo-
28. This is because contract C lies below the good corporation's indifference curve
that goes through contract A, but contract C lies above the bad corporation's
indifference curve that goes through contract A.
29. This is what Aghion and Hermalin refer to as a "symmetric information
contract" because it represents the contract that bad corporations would enter if
information about type were symmetrically known by all parties. Aghion & Hermalin,
supra note 2, at 388.
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rations in the lenders eyes. If the good corporations offer contract
D, (or any contracts to the right along the good lending line, Lg), the
bad corporations will not be induced to match their signals because
the bad corporations will prefer the symmetric information contract
B (in which lenders can infer that they are financing bad projects).
The good corporations cannot effectively signal by offering con-
tracts to the left of D along the good lending line, because the bad
corporations would be induced to match (which consequently would
stop the lenders from lending). Thus, under these conditions, the
separating equilibrium will have good corporations contracting with
lenders at contract point D and bad corporations contracting with
lenders at point B. This is the contract point that maximizes the
good corporation's utility within the class of signals that deters false
matching by the bad corporation.30
30. Technically, the good corporations may need to offer a contract with an
arbitrarily small amount to the right along the good lending line, so that the bad
corporations are not merely indifferent between sending false signals.
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Although this signaling is individually rational, it generates clear
social inefficiency. A pooled equilibrium at point A is Pareto supe-
rior; both good and bad corporations move to higher levels of utility
- (in Graph D, contract point A lies below the equilibrium indiffer-
ence curves for both good and bad corporations) - and the lenders
continue to earn a competitive rate of return. But as argued before,
pooling at contract A is not a laissez-faire equilibrium; good corpo-
rations will have incentives to contract for inefficiently high amounts
of repayments if the project fails31 in order to stop their cross-subsi-
31. The higher repaymenls if the project fails are inefficient because the
corporations are risk averse and are bearing inefficienlly high risk relative to the risk
neutral lenders. The inefficiency of point D can be seen in Graph D from the fact that
the good corporation's indifference curve is not tangent to the good lending line at
contract point D. Contract point D is not the good corporation's symmetric equilibrium
contract.
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dization of the bad corporations. This inefficiency is generated by a
species of externality. The existence of bad corporations and their
penchant for false matching or adverse selection imposes an exter-
nality on good corporations. The inefficiency of signaling stems not
only from the efforts of good corporations to signal but also from
the efforts of bad corporations to falsely match those signals which
cause the good corporations to run even further away from the effi-
cient contracting point.
The potential inefficiency of signaling was eloquently captured by
Doctor Seuss in his parable about the Sneetches.32 High~status
Sneetches had stars on their bellies and low-status Sneetches did
not. As the tale unfolds, vast inefficiencies are generated as the low-
status Sneetches try to match the high-status ones by affixing stars
to their bellies and the high-status Sneetches try to further distin-
guish themselves by then removing their stars. The moral of the
story is that finding credible signals may be extremely hard and that
the mere attempt to distinguish yourself whether or not it succeeds can
generate social inefficiencies.33
This simple example also has important implications for Easter-
brook's and Fischel's hypothetical contract thesis. Even if we set the
default repayment terms at (what might be the social efficient) con-
tract A, the private. incentives will lead to inefficient contracting.
This inefficiency appears even though it is costless to contract
around the default term and even though the lending market to sup-
ply finance capital is extremely competitive. Indeed, the costless-
ness of contracting exacerbates the social inefficiency. If contracting
technology or legCJ.I intervention increased the costs of moving away
from point A, a ~ore, efficient result might ensue.34 Easterbrook
and Fishel may be right that, because transaction costs are low in the
corporate context, the. choice of corporate governance defaults will
not effect the contractual equilibrium.35 This model provides a
counterexample, however, to the claim that low transaction costs in-
32. DR. SEUSS, THE SNEETCHES AND OTHER STORIES 1-25 (1961).
33. Dr. Seuss seemed to have a more fundamental moral that the status distinction in
the Sneetches context was really irrelevant. In many contexts, however, distinguishing
among underlying characteristics of a contracting party may have important effects on
allocative efficiency.
34. Indeed, this is one of the many powerful insights of Agion & Hermalin, supra
note 2, and their predecessors. It should be stressed again that this model is largely
derivative of this rich genre. See David Besanko, Monopoly and Quality Distortion: Effects and
Remedies. 102 QJ. ECON. 743 (1987); Johnston, supra note 2; Rothchild & Stiglitz, supra
note 20; Stiglitz. supra note 26; John Wilson, A Model of Insurance Markets with Incomplete
Information. 16J. ECON. THEORY 167 (1977).
35. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38
STAN. L. REV. 271, 277-79 (1986).
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sure efficient contracting. In this simple reworking of the Roths-
child-Stiglitz model of adverse selection, we see that regardless of
the default rule, there will be inefficient signaling in a laissez faire
contractual equilibrium.
The model suggests that contractual inefficiencies can no longer
be laid solely at the door of out-of-pocket transaction costs. For
even when contracting is costless, the existence of asymmetric infor-
mation can induce inefficiencies. For those die-hard transaction
cost adherents, there is still a sense in which the inefficiencies can be
attributed to costs of contracting. At the beginning of the model, I
suggested that the lenders and the courts could not tell after the fact
whether a particular project had been good or bad, and thus con-
tracts could only be made contingent on the success or failure of the
investment. This assumption, that the project quality was "non-
contractible," could be considered as an assumption that the costs
of specifying and proving a quality provision, (making repayment
explicitly contingent on project quality), was prohibitively expen-
sive. If quality were ex post known and hence ex ante contractible,
then first best separation could occur without inefficient signaling as
the good types simply offered contracts that were explicitly contin-
gent on project quality as well as outcome.
Inefficient contracts are also generated even in the absence of
what we would normally think of as "bargaining."36 The strategic
decisions of the privately informed to signal and falsely signal are
not limited to bilateral bargaining. This model clearly demonstrates
that the inefficiencies of excessive signaling can take place even
when large classes of corporations propose take-it-or-Ieave-it "stan-
dard form" type contracts to large classes of those competing for
investment opportunities. Thus, numerosity and competition can-
not unambiguously eliminate the pathological effects of asymmetric
information and adverse selection.
These asymmetric information models argue against Easter-
brook's and Fischel's unqualified faith in regulating corporations
with the default rules that the parties would have contracted for if
contracting were costless. The inefficiencies of excessive signaling
may, in particular contexts, militate for the use of immutable rules
or the strategic choice of defaults - including penalty defaults -
that might induce more efficient pooling or separation. In this re-
gard, lawmakers principally have three forms of intervention as an
alternative to the hypothetical contract defaults:
(1) penalty defaults,
36. This point is also recognized by Johnslon, supra nOle 2, al 621-22.
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(2) single-sided immutable rules, and
(3) immutable rules.
Penalty defaults encourage parties to contract around them and
thereby may induce more efficient separation.37 Single-sided immu-
table rules usually allow parties to contract for more fiduciary pro-
tection, but prohibit contracting for less than a specified
minimum.38 The corporate opportunity doctrine may, for example,
represent a single-sided immutable rule. Corporations can contract
for higher fiduciary duty not to take corporate opportunities,39 but
may not be able ex ante to waive the basic fiduciary duty. The immu-
table ceilings or floors in such single-sided immutable rules might
be used by policy makers to induce separation in markets where lais-
sez faire contracting produced inefficient pooling or inefficient sepa-
ration. Finally, as demonstrated directly in the foregoing model of
corporate debt, financing the use of immutable rules to induce a
pooled equilibrium can effectively eliminate the debilitating effects
of attempts to signal and to signal falsely.
II. REHABILITATING THE HYPOTHETICAL CONTRACT ApPROACH
Having argued for the possibility of inefficient corporate con-
tracts, let me now suggest reasons why we do not in practice see the
kinds of excessive signaling by those "insiders" who, by definition,
have various species of private information to which the market in-
vestors are not privy. While asymmetric information models of this
kind can generate excessive and inefficient forms of signaling re-
garding issues of corporate finance and disclosure decisions,40 it is
more difficult to see how provisions in the corporate charter and by-
laws are infected by excessive attempts to signal.
The simple models of asymmetric information set forth above
have the good types willing to take on additional liability if things go
badly - to signal to the uninformed market that they are good. To
be sure there is plenty of asymmetric information in the corporate
setting and plenty of good- and bad-type heterogeneity. But the
movement of corporate law in recent decades has not been of good
37. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 7, 106-07. Penalty defaults may, however,
encourage all parties to contract for a new and inefficient pooled equilibrium.
38. See Ian Ayres, Analyzing Stock Lock-ups: Do Target treasury Sales Foreclose or Facilitate
Takeover Auctions?, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 682. 709 (1990).
39. Some corporations, for example, contract for the patent rights to all inventions
developed during a job tenure, even if the invention is developed independent of the
employment relationship.
40. See generally HUBBARD, supra note 22; Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating How
Corporations Speak to the Market, 77 VA. L. REV. 945 (1991) (discussing Fraud-on-Market
Theory as developed in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988».
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insiders signaling that they are good by taking on additional liability.
The legislative race - whether it be to the top or the bottom - has
most broadly reduced the fiduciary duties of those very actors who
are the most informed. And this legislative movement has not been
accompanied by massive efforts by corporations to contract around
these duties.
Conceptually, one could tell a story where the investors were will-
ing to waive management liability as a way of signaling managers
about some form of investor information. But the realities of the
market place and limited liability make it implausible to believe that
shareholders in publicly traded corporations possess private infor-
mation to which the managers are not privy. Thus, the simple sig-
naling model generates "arm-breaking" contracts41 where insiders
would signal their quality by heaping on additional fiduciary duties
and higher penalties for breaching these duties. Casual empiricism
runs strongly counter to this model's implication. Why is this so?
One answer may be that the inefficient signaling models are artifacts
of adverse selection, and in the real world, problems of moral haz-
ard predominate. Rea has shown that trying to control the
problems of moral hazard - getting the players to take the right
amount of precaution, etc. - might conflict with trying to control
the problems of adverse selection.42 The possibility that problems
of moral hazard dominate the principal-agent context might explain
why good corporate agents do not commit to heightened fiduciary
duties.
But the rejection of this simple signaling model does not vindicate
the Easterbrook and Fischel enterprise completely. Game theorists
are just starting to sink their teeth into the complexities of the cor-
poration's nexus of contracts. An important recent effort by Jason
Johnston43 shows that contractual inefficiencies can persist in more
detailed models of corporate governance. In the context of closed
corporations, Johnston asks whether corporate law should impose a
default fiduciary duty upon majority shareholders to discourage ma-
jority termination of minority shareholders from participation in the
firm. Central to Johnston's model is double-sided asymmetric infor-
mation; Johnston assumes that both majority and minority share-
holders have private information that is not initially known to the
other. Johnston models the double-sided asymmetric information
in a way that is a natural extension of our single sided asymmetry.
He analyzes the case where there are two types of minority share-
41. See Rea, supra note 2, at 196-97.
42. Aghion & Herma1in, supra note 2, at 400.
43. Johnston, supra note 2.
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holders (who manage the corporation), and two types of majority
shareholders (who are the entrepreneurs and control the board).
Both sides of the contract want to know what type it is dealing with
across the table. Suffice it to say that the possibilities for strategic
inefficiencies abound in this type of model. It is still important to
note, however, that the model is limited to close corporations where
double-sided asymmetric information is much more prevalent. The
more significant question is whether Easterbrook's and Fishel's hy-
pothetical contract thesis will withstand the game-theoretic chal-
lenge as applied to the most important form of business
organization - publicly traded corporations.
This article has attempted to argue the more modest claim that
hypothetical contract adherents cannot comfortably put their faith
in low transaction costs and high numbers of potential contractors.
As a practical matter ofjudicial administration, it is likely that hypo-
thetical standards will continue to be efficient for most legal rules.44
But if our faith in efficiency is to have a theoretical as well as an
empirical basis,45 we must search for other structural bases that
would eliminate this possibility of contractual failure. As with a
growing number of legal issues, once game-theorists have shown
the possibility of strategic inefficiency, the choice of the most effica-
cious legal rule will devolve to empirical issues instead of a priori
theory.46
44. For an insightful discussion of this point, see Scott, supra note 13, at 613-15.
45. It is possible that academics will be satisfied with an empirical assessment that
corporate governance provisions are efficient. After all, Posner's common law efficiency
hypothesis is supported primarily by his massive empirical effort to demonstrate that the
vast majority of common law rules are efficient, even though Posner has been agnostic
about providing a theoretic "causal mechanism" for this efficiency. See, e.g., WILLIAM M.
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAw 14 (1987).
46. See Ayres, supra note 1, at 1315-17.
